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Gregory: Religious Harassment in the Workplace

RELIGIOUS HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EEOC's PROPOSED
GUIDELINES
David L. Gregory"
INTRODUCTION

We are here at this symposium because of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Underlying RFRA was a Supreme Court decision about (un)employment law. Employment
Division v. Smith,1 let us remember at the outset, was a decision
about (un)employment. Of course, the Supreme Court's notorious, widely criticized2 decision in Smith was primarily about the
t Copyright © 1995, Montana Law Review; David L. Gregory.
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., 1973, The
Catholic University of America; M.B.A., 1977, Wayne State University; J.D. 1980,
University of Detroit; LL.M., 1982, Yale University; J.S.D., 1987, Yale University.
Michael D. Jew and Thomas P. McDonough provided meticulous research assistance.
St. John's University School of Law provided a faculty summer research grant.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. For a critical commentary on the Smith decision, see Ann E. Beeson, Dances with Justice: Peyotism in the Courts, 41 EMoRY L.J. 1121, 1125 (1992) (describing
the Smith decision as "the culmination of judicial misunderstanding of peyotism," and
suggesting that the Court misapplied free exercise precedents as established in previous cases and created amorphous and incorrect distinctions between religious beliefs
and religious action); Gabrielle G. Davison, The "Extreme and Hypothetical' Come to
Life: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 43 CATH. U. L. REV.
641, 643 and 647 (1994) (asserting that while the Smith test appears to result in a
clearer standard for free exercise challenges, "in reality it has greatly decreased the
protection that the Free Exercise Clause historically has provided to religious
groups." And further arguing that the Smith court's focus on neutrality of religious
restrictions "fails to effectuate the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause ....
Consequently, the Smith analysis accords less deference to this fundamental right than the
most trivial claim under the Equal Protection Clause."); Richard F. Duncan, Who
Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 419 (1994) (arguing that "[allthough
Smith has a few scholarly defenders, the general view among the commentators is
that the decision is seriously flawed as a matter of textual interpretation, historical
analysis, and in its understanding of free exercise precedents."); Mary A. Glendon &
Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 530-32 (1991) (criticizing the Court's more deferential test in free exercise cases as applied in Smith:
A mechanically applied deferential approach could be subversive of individual, associational, and institutional free exercise, especially where small,
unconventional, or unpopular religions are concerned ....

If Smith does,

as many fear, represent the Court's adoption of a reflexive, mechanical form
of deference, the results could be as inimical to religious freedom as they
were under the old separationist approaches. "The principal problem with
Smith . .. is the current majority's readiness to accept unsupported government assertions about the nature and strength of its interests, without
reckoning the likely burdens in each case on free exercise.);

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995

1

120

Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 5

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

First Amendment (un)free exercise of religion. But Smith was
also an (un)employment law case. It also was the single most
David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us Pray (But Not "Them"!): The Troubled
Jurisprudenceof Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273 (1991); Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Freedom, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 713, 749 (1993) (arguing:
[dlespite cries in the literature that it dramatically changed free exercise
jurisprudence, Smith reiterated the Court's entrenched use of the belief/conduct paradigm and its longstanding doctrine against singling out any
particular religion. Hence, Smith is not radically different from its forerunners; the single change made is a downward adjustment of the level of
scrutiny to be applied to regulations of conduct within the belief/conduct
paradigm.);
Richard Herz, Legal Protections for Indigenous Cultures: Sacred Sites and Communal
Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 691 (1993) (arguing that by explicitly rejecting the notion that
the state was required to demonstrate a compelling purpose for measures substantially burdening religious practice, Smith has essentially excluded the idea of accommodation of communal rights under the Free Exercise Clause); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20-25 (arguing that "[i]f the Court
intends to defer to any formally neutral law restricting religion, then it has created
a legal framework for persecution, and persecutions will result," and that the Smith
decision may also cause greater persecution of groups that cannot defend themselves
via the political process); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The
Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 609
(1991) (stating:
In the context of special treatment of religion, positive acts by the political
branches will generally produce more detriments to the principle of equal
religious liberty than benefits to the principle of religious liberty per se.
Smith is thus profoundly wrong on both substantive and institutional
grounds, and the voluntary accommodations it invites will in the long run
do far more harm than good to the ends of the religion clauses);
Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 252
(1994) (arguing that "[a]lthough written by Justice Scalia, the leading proponent on
the Court of judicial reliance on the original meaning of the text, the Smith opinion
simply ignores the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Free Exercise
Clause. Nor does the opinion even faintly attempt to parse the text of the clause.");
Kenneth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith.- the Supreme Court Alters the State of
Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1433 and 1465-66 (1991) (suggesting
that removing the strict scrutiny of free exercise claims will eliminate a "significant
safeguard of liberty" and generate legislative indifference towards religious beliefs,
and noting that "[riegardless of the effect upon a particular religion, the government
is free to pass any law or engage in any practice that it deems necessary, as long as
its motive is not discriminatory."); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (arguing the Smith decision
is flawed in its use of legal sources and its theoretical argument); Elliot Mincberg, A
Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Judicial Prior Restraint and the First
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 874 (1993) (noting first that groups. as divergent
as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of Evangelicals
supported RFRA, then noting that "constitutional liberty has been severely damaged
by the decision in Smith"); Roald Mykkelvedt, Employment Division v. Smitl." Creating Anxiety by Relieving Tension, 58 TENN. L. REV. 603, 632-33 (1991) (noting the
irony that Smith was issued on the eve of the two-hundredth anniversary of the Bill
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prominent spur leading to the enactment in November, 1993 of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.3
of Rights:

Even as the nation prepared to celebrate the bicentennial of that historic
document, the Court acted to terminate the preferred status of one of the
most fundamental rights contained therein, the right to practice one's religion free from unnecessary governmental restrictions. It seems almost inconceivable that such an abrupt and portentous rejection of firmly established
constitutional law will not be overturned after the justices have fully reconsidered the implications of their ruling.);
Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
490, 559 (1992) (arguing "the guarantee of free exercise gives a person a presumptive
right to act on sincere religious belief even when that action is proscribed by otherwise valid law. Employment Division v. Smith ... is simply wrong."); Andrew M.
Zeitlin, A Test of Faith:Accommodating Religious Employees' "Work Related Misconduct" in the United States and Canada, 15 COMP. LAB. L. 250, 271-72 (1994) (arguing Smith was "poorly drafted and relied largely on authorities long considered extinct," and was motivated by "an overreaction to the drug crisis."). But see William
P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
308 (1991) (arguing for the outcome of Smith but not for the Court's rationale).
3. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V. 1993),
enacted November 16, 1993, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that (1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise
without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion;
and

(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interest.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this Act are (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion
is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government. (emphasis added).
For recent commentary beyond this symposium on RFRA, see Allan Ides, The
Text of the Free Exercise Clause As A Measure of Employment Division v. Smith and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135 (1994); Douglas

Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 883 (1994); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause:
Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106,
1156 (1994) (While it attempts to correct the Smith decision, "RFRA is thin gruel for
those who reject Smith's narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause. RFRA is a
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Alfred Smith and Galen Rose, members of the Native American Church, were drug and alcohol counselors at the Douglas
County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, a private, non-profit
rehabilitation center in Oregon.4 They sacramentally ingested
hallucinogenic peyote during a religious ceremony of the Native
American Church. Their employment was then terminated, consistent with the employer's policy, which prohibited employee
unlawful use of controlled substances. The Oregon Employment
Division denied their claims for unemployment compensation,
accepting instead the employer's position that the termination of
employment was properly due to their work-related misconduct.5
In a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court found that the
state's denial of unemployment compensation and, more fundamentally, but only implicitly, the termination of their employment did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.6 Thus, in its core aspects, the decision most responsible for leading to RFRA was grounded in (un)employment
law.
I am a beggar at the banquet of this symposium, surrounded
by nationally prominent scholars of law and religion. I have no
such expertise, and I am here primarily as a labor and employment academic lawyer.' It is in this capacity that I wish to
majoritarian protection subject to later repeal or modification by shifting political
coalitions. Even if left intact, the statutory terms themselves may receive the same
narrow reading as that given to the Free Exercise Clause in Smith." Id.)
4. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 890.
7.
I have integrated labor and employment law scholarship with themes of law
and religion. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Actualizing What Ought To Be: A Response
To Professor Milner S. Ball, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 55 (1991); David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory And The Transformation Of Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119
(1988) [hereinafter Catholic]; David L. Gregory, Government Regulation Of Religion
Through Labor and Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REV. 27 (1992);
Gregory & Russo, supra note 2; David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Overcoming
NLRB v. Yeshiva University By The Implementation Of Catholic Labor Theory, 41
LAB. L.J. 55 (1990)[hereinafter NLRB]; David L. Gregory, Teaching Moral Values In
Public Schools: Some Constitutional Considerations, 31 CATH. LAW. 173 (1987); David
L. Gregory, The First Amendment Religion Clauses And Labor Employment Law In
The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1986); David L. Gregory
& Charles J. Russo, The Return Of School Prayer: Reflections On The Libertarian Conservative Dilemma, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 167 (1991); David L. Gregory, The Role Of
Religion In the Secular Workplace, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 749
(1990); David L. Gregory, Where To Pray? A Survey Regarding Prayer Rooms In
ABA. Accredited, Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1287
(1993); David L. Gregory, The Religious, the Ethical, the Communal and the Future,
41 CATH. U. L. REv. 651 (1992) (reviewing FREDERICK M. GEDIcKs AND ROGER
HENDRIX, CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE
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probe some very current labor and employment law issues in the
wake of RFRA, with special attention to the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) proposed guidelines, purportedly designed to prohibit religious harassment in
the secular workplace.8
(1991)); David L. Gregory, Book Review, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 191 (1985) (reviewing
LEO PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT (1984)); David L. Gregory,
Book Review, 29 CATH. LAW. 344 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD MARIUs, THOMAS MORE
(1984)).
8. The proposed EEOC guidelines to prohibit harassment based on race, color,
religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability, published on October 1, 1993,
provide:
§ 1609.1 Harassment.
(a) Harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, national
origin, age, or disability constitutes discrimination in the terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment and, as such, violates Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. [§1 2000e et seq. (title VII); the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. [§] 621 et
seq. (ADEA); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. [§] 12101 et
seq. (ADA); or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 701 et
seq., as applicable.
(b)(1) Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or
shows hostility or aversion toward an individual because of his/her race,
color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability, or that of his/her
relatives, friends, or associates, and that:
(i) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;
(ii) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance; or
(iii) Otherwise adversely affects an individual's employment
opportunities.
(2) Harassing conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(i) Epithets, slurs, negative stereotyping, or threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts, that relate to race, color, religion, gender, national
original, age, or disability; and
(ii) Written or graphic material that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an individual or group because of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability and that is placed on walls,
bulletin boards, or elsewhere on the employer's premises, or circulated in
the workplace.
(c) The standard for determining whether verbal or physical conduct
relating to race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or abusive work environment is whether a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances
would find the conduct intimidating, hostile, or abusive. The "reasonable
person" standard includes consideration of the perspective of persons of the
alleged victim's race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability. It is not necessary to make an additional showing of psychological harm.
(d) An employer, employment agency, joint apprenticeship committee,
or labor organization (hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer") has
an affirmative duty to maintain a working environment free of harassment
on any of these bases. Harassing conduct may be challenged even if the
complaining employee(s) are not specifically intended targets of the conduct.
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In this article, Part I will present a brief overview of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which generally prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of religion, and which

(e) In determining whether the alleged conduct constitutes harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality
of the circumstances, including the nature of the conduct and the context in
which it occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action
will be made from the facts, on a case-by-case basis.
§ 1609.2 Employer liability for harassment.
(a) An employer is liable for its conduct and that of its agents and
supervisory employees with respect to workplace harassment on the basis of
race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability:
(1) Where the employer knew or should have known of the conduct
and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action; or
(2) Regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known of the conduct, where the harassing supervisory employee is acting
in an "agency capacity." To determine whether the harassing individual is
acting in an "agency capacity," the circumstances of the particular employment relationship and the job functions performed by the harassing individual shall be examined. "Apparent authority" to act on the employer's behalf
shall be established where the employer fails to institute an explicit policy
against harassment that is clearly and regularly communicated to employees, or fails to establish a reasonably accessible procedure by which victims
of harassment can make their complaints known to appropriate officials who
are in a position to act on complaints.
(b) With respect to conduct between co-workers, an employer is responsible for acts of harassment in the workplace that relate to race, color,
religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability where the employer or its
agents or supervisory employees knew or should have known of the conduct,
and the employer failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.
(c) An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees with respect to harassment of employees in the workplace related to
race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability where the
employer or its agents or supervisory employees knew or should have
known of the conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action, as feasible. In reviewing these cases, the Commission will consider the extent of the employer's control over non-employees and any other
legal responsibility that the employer may have had with respect to the
conduct of such non-employees on a case-by-case basis.
(d) Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of harassment. An
employer should take all steps necessary to prevent harassment from occurring, including having an explicit policy against harassment that is clearly
and regularly communicated to employees, explaining sanctions for harassment, developing methods to sensitize all supervisory and non-supervisory
employees on issues of harassment, and informing employees of their right
to raise, and the procedures for raising, the issue of harassment under title
VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. An employer should
provide an effective complaint procedure by which employees can make their
complaints known to appropriate officials who are in a position to act on
them. 58 Fed. Reg. 51268 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1, 1993, but withdrawn Oct. 11, 1994).
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also requires the employer to reasonably accommodate the
employee's religious practices.9 Part I will also examine the very
few reported cases that prohibit secular private employers from
imposing unwelcome religious practices on subordinate employees as a condition of employment. Part II will assess the EEOC
proposed guidelines, designed to prohibit religious harassment in
the workplace. The proposed guidelines were first published by
the EEOC in the Federal Register on October 1, 1993. Ironically,
this was more than six weeks before President Clinton signed
RFRA into law on November 16, 1993. After the EEOC received
more than 100,000 mostly negative comments, and following
highly critical congressional hearings in June, 1994, on August
20, 1994, Congress approved an appropriations bill instructing
the EEOC to scrap the proposed guidelines.' ° Because the

9. Title VII defines "religion" as follows:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice,
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business.
42 U.S.C. 1§J 2000e(j) (1988).
10. On August 20, 1994, Congress approved an appropriations bill instructing
the EEOC to scrap its proposed guidelines on religious harassment. The vote was
overwhelming. The House of Representatives voted 366 to 37 to eliminate funding for
the rules, and the Senate voted 94-0 to reject the EEOC proposed guidelines. On
August 26, 1994, President Clinton signed that bill into law. Jay W. Waks & Christopher R. Brewster, Proposed EEOC Guidelines on 'Religious Harassment'Provoked a
Firestorm of Criticism, Causing the Agency to Pull Back For Now, NAT'L L.J., September 12, 1994, at B5. On September 19, the EEOC responded to this virulent
opposition by voting 3-0 that the "Proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on
Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age or Disability" be "withdrawn from
consideration." Larry Witham, Work Rules on Religion Dropped; Amid Uproar, EEOC
Backs Off, WASH. TIMES, September 21, 1994, at Al. "With the general public outcry
and the legislation in Congress, the Commission just felt the guidelines should be
withdrawn," said EEOC spokesman Michael Widomski. Id.
In rejecting the EEOC proposed guidelines, the President and Congress reacted
to a "virtual firestorm of opposition" from groups that feared that the guidelines'
vagueness on regulating religious expression in the workplace was constitutionally
suspect and difficult to apply. Waks & Brewster, supra, at B7. The EEOC received
more that 100,000 comments, the vast majority opposed to the regulations. Id. While
some lawmakers and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith supported the proposed guidelines, Christian legal groups, family advocacy lobbies, and the American
Civil Liberties Union all opposed the rules. Witham, supra, at Al.
Dudley C. Rochelle, a labor lawyer from Atlanta, Georgia, is credited--or
blamed-for the demise of the proposed guidelines. The protest movement began in
November,- 1993, after Rochelle sent a letter to business clients indicating that employers could only avoid religious harassment lawsuits by banning all religious expression in the workplace, including prayer groups and bibles. Gayle White, Atlanta
Lawyer Complained; EEOC Scraps Harassment Guidelines, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Sept. 23, 1994, at A5. In late January, she released a twenty-one page analysis of
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EEOC will eventually return to the issue, and because religious
harassment in the workplace ought not to occur without a remedy, the guidelines will merit future reconsideration. Part III of
the article provides a discussion of the role of Title VII in addressing religious harassment in the workplace. Finally, Part IV
will offer some concluding thoughts.
I. TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION AND REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION: AN OVERVIEW

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of, inter alia, religion. Title VII
also requires the secular employer to provide reasonable accommodation of the religiously-affiliated employee's religious practices.11 The statute also allows the religious, non-secular employer

the proposed guidelines as religious groups began lobbying Congress and lawmakers
started to question the rules. Witham, supra, at Al. "It's been amazing for me to see
how this thing arose entirely from the grass roots," Rochelle said. Id.
While the vote in the Senate was unanimous, not all senators felt that the
EEOC proposed guidelines should be scrapped. Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, an Ohio
Democrat, argued in favor of the rules at Senate hearings, and called fears that the
proposed guidelines would be abused "absurd." Id. Metzenbaum reportedly believed
that the withdrawal of religious harassment from any EEOC guidelines send the
signal that religious harassment is less objectionable than other forms. Id. Senator
Howard Heflin, a Democrat from Alabama and active critic of the proposed guidelines, called the EEOC's decision to discard the proposed guidelines "a victory for
religious freedom." Religious Harassment Rules Shelved, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994,
at A17.
However, in passing the bill that pulled the plug on the present guidelines,
Congress left the EEOC open to propose new regulations on religious harassment.
'Any new guidelines . . . shall be drafted so as to make explicitly clear that symbols or expressions of a religious belief consistent with the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 are not to be restricted and do not constitute proof of harassment." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 708, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 94
(1994). In fact, Congress instructed the EEOC to hold public hearings and receive
public comment on any new guidelines of religious harassment that it might propose.
Waks & Brewster, supra at B7.
While EEOC spokesman Widomski indicated that '[t]here are no plans at this
point to revisit [religious harassment rules]," White, supra at A5, both opponents and
supporters of the EEOC's decision to scrap the proposed guidelines do not believe
that the effort to broaden harassment rules to include religion is dead. Witham,
supra at Al. With three new members joining the EEOC, the commission is likely to
try again and draft a new set of harassment guidelines including religion. Id. "The
fact [the EEOC] withdrew [the proposed guidelines] in toto could mean that they
would rather drop it and begin work on the same thing again," said Rochelle. Id.
11. See David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Religion Through Labor
and Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REv. 27 (1992); David L. Gregory, The Role of Religion for the Secular Workplace, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POLY 749 (1990) [hereinafter Role of Religion].
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to require its employees to adhere to the tenets of the religion.12
The Supreme Court has held that these Title VII provisions do
not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
despite potential facial tensions between Title VII's religion provisions and the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.13 Title VII, the First Amendment Religion Clauses, RFRA, and possible future EEOC guidelines, can all be brought to bear upon issues of religion in the secular workplace.
The Title VII requirement that the secular employer reasonably accommodate the religious practices of the employee has
been utterly minimized by the Court. In 1986, the decision of the
Supreme Court in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook"4
reaffirmed and strengthened its 1977 decision in TWA v.
15 In both
Hardison.
cases, the Court supported collective bargaining agreement constraints on the scope of reasonable accommodation. Hardison, a Sabbatarian, was employed as a unionrepresented TWA clerk in a twenty-four hour, 365-day operation
at the stores department of the airline's Kansas City base. While
working on the eleven p.m. to seven 7 a.m. shift, he had sufficient seniority to avoid working on his Sabbath. But when he
transferred to another building and shift, he lost seniority; therefore, when he refused to work on his Sabbath, he was discharged.16 Because of the labor contract terms, the Court found
that any further alternative reduced work schedules or substitutions were not feasible and would have been unreasonable
accommodations not required by law.
Philbrook, a teacher, had three paid days annually for religious observance, pursuant to the terms of the labor contract. He
wanted to use additional contractual personal leave time for
additional religious observance or, in the alternative, he wanted
his employer to allow him to pay a substitute worker for these
occasions. As in Hardison, the Court in Philbrook found that
these alternative proposals to accommodate the employee's religious practices were unreasonable and therefore were not required by Title VII. 17 With these two leading decisions, Title VII
has been rendered largely meaningless as a source of protection
for the religiously observant employee of the secular employer.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Gregory, Role of Religion, supra note 11, at 754.
Id.
479 U.S. 60 (1986).
432 U.S. 63 (1977).
Id. at 66-69.
479 U.S. at 68-71.
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Unlike Title VII, prior to Smith, the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause protected, at least to some extent, Sabbatarians
who were unable to work on their Sabbath. While they could be
lawfully terminated from their employment, they at least were
able to collect unemployment compensation. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Floridais in 1987 reaffirmed and
strengthened this line of Supreme Court decisions from Sherbert
v. Verner 9 in 1963 through Thomas v. Review Board0 in 1981.
Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security" in 1989
extended unemployment compensation eligibility to even a "generic Christian" who refused to work on Sunday. Although interrupted by Smith, this limited free exercise right has been restored by RFRA.
Lower courts have only rarely been presented with the conundrum of whether the law can simultaneously protect the free
exercise rights of religiously identified persons and of those who
wish to be free from such practices. These cases have most often
arisen in the particular context of prayer services in the secular
workplace. For example, Young v. Southwestern Savings and
Loan Ass'n22 perfectly illustrates the tensions that occur when a
secular private sector employer's managerial agents impose unwelcome religious practices on subordinate employees as a condition of employment.
Mrs. Young began employment as a teller for the bank in
February, 1971. She knew that all employees were required to
attend a monthly staff meeting at the downtown office of the
bank. Employees were paid for these fourty-five minute meetings, which reviewed bank business ranging from organization
policy to future planning. The problem for Mrs. Young, a former
Unitarian and now an atheist, was that the monthly meeting
began with a "short religious talk and a prayer, both delivered
by a local Baptist minister."23
Mrs. Young attended the first two monthly meetings, but
thereafter resolved no longer to attend because she felt that her
freedom of conscience was being violated by the convocation
prayers. She did not mention this to anyone. She simply ceased

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Gregory,
23.

480 U.S. 136 (1987).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
989 U.S. 829 (1989).
509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975). For extensive discussion of this case, also see
Role of Religion, supra, note 11 at 757.
509 F.2d at 142.
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her attendance. Her absence was finally noted at the September,
1971 monthly meeting. Management informed her that her attendance was mandatory and that the primary purpose of the
monthly meeting was discussion of bank business. She was told
that she "had an obligation to attend the entire meeting, and
advised her that if she objected to the devotionals, she could
simply 'close [her] ears' during that time."2' She disclosed her
reason for not attending the meetings, and because she would
not compromise her beliefs, she involuntarily resigned "in order
to escape intolerable and illegal employment requirements."2'
She later maintained that she was constructively discharged.
The Fifth Circuit held in her favor and reversed the discharge. The court found "that Mrs. Young was constructively
discharged in circumstances which amounted to religious discrimination against her by Southwestern."28 The court of appeals immediately focused on the opening prayer at the mandatory monthly bank business meeting as unlawful employment
discrimination on the basis of religion, in violation of Title VII.
"This theological appetizer, nondenominational though it might
be, was somewhat uncongenial to plaintiff, who is an atheist."'
In September of 1988, the Ninth Circuit further elucidated
these complex issues in E.E.O.C. v. Townley Engineering and
Manufacturing Company.2' The Ninth Circuit's opinion, and the
formidable dissent of Judge John Noonan,2' recognized the inherent tensions between the prayer activities in the workplace of
the religiously-affiliated supervisors, and the contrary practices
or non-affiliations of subordinate employees. The court of appeals
held that an atheist employee who affirmatively objected could
not be compelled to attend the religious services sponsored upon
the premises of the employer, a mining equipment manufacturer.
The court found that the free exercise rights of the religiously
identified owners of secular corporations must, on balance, yield
to the Title VII protection afforded to objecting employees:
"Where the practices of employer and employee conflict, as in

24. Id.
25. Id. at 144.
26. Id. at 143.
27. Id. at 142.
28. 859 F.2d 610, (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1077 (1989); see Gregory, Role of Religion, supra note 11.
29. Prior to his appointment to the Ninth Circuit by President Reagan, Judge
Noonan was a professor of law at Notre Dame and at the University of California at
Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law. He has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Catholic
University of America and law degree from Harvard.
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this case, it is not inappropriate to require the employer, who
structures the workplace to a substantial degree, to travel the
extra mile in adjusting its free exercise rights, if any, to accommodate the employee's Title VII rights."30
The closely held corporation was founded in 1964 by Jake
and Helen Townley, who own ninety-four percent of the stock. It
manufactures mining equipment for commercial profit at several
different facilities. When the Townleys, who are born-again
Christians, founded the business, they "made a covenant with
God that their business would be a Christian, faith-operated
business."" The company printed and enclosed Gospel quotes
on all of its documents and mail, and financially supported missionaries.
It held weekly religious devotional services in the workplace.
"They typically last[ed] from thirty to forty-five minutes, and
[variously] included prayer, thanksgiving to God, singing, testimony, and scripture reading, as well as discussion of business
related matters. Townley required all employees to attend the
weekly services; failure to attend was regarded as equivalent to
not attending work." 32 These services have been conducted at
the corporation's Florida facility since it commenced operations
in 1963. It opened an Arizona facility in 1973, but did not institute the weekly religious devotional services there until 1984. An
atheist employee, hired at the Arizona facility in 1979, objected
to the services shortly after they were instituted in 1984. s3 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
ruling that requiring employees to attend its religious services
and failing to accommodate the atheist employee's requests to be
excused violated Title VII.
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held:
Congress did clearly intend for Title VII to cover Townley's
mandatory devotional services. Sections 701(j) and 703(a) of
Title VII make clear that requiring employees over their objections to attend devotional services cannot be reconciled with
Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination. Furthermore, we hold that Congress did not intend section 702's exemption for religious corporations to shield corporations such as

30. Townley, 859 F.2d at 621.
31. Id. at 612.
32. Id.
33. Id. The atheist employee shortly thereafter left the company, claiming constructive discharge. In April, 1988, the district court ruled in favor of the employee;
the constructive discharge issue, however, was not before the Ninth Circuit.
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Townley. We do hold, however, that Jake and Helen Townley
have certain rights under the Free Exercise Clause that Title
VII cannot infringe.'
Although the owners were devoutly religious, their corporation was secular in its purpose and operation; it manufactured
mining equipment. Therefore, it could not claim the status of a
religious corporation within the meaning of section 702 of Title
VII. The religious affiliations and practices of the individual
owners did not transform the secular corporation into a religious
organization. "We merely hold that the beliefs of the owners and
operators of a corporation are simply not enough in themselves
to make the corporation 'religious' within the meaning of section
702."35
The employer admitted that it never attempted to accommodate the atheist employee's objections to the religious services.
The employee was told he could wear earplugs and/or read a
newspaper, but he had to be physically present. Despite the
dissent's view that these conditions were a sufficient accommodation, the majority of the court agreed with the employee's proposal that the employer must reasonably accommodate his request
to be excused from attendance, ruling that "the burden of attempting an accommodation rests with the employer rather than
the employee."' The owners' free exercise rights would have to
yield to the Title VII right of the objecting employee to be excused from attending the employer's religious services. The court
emphasized that the employer's Arizona facility operated for its
first eleven years, from its opening in 1973 to 1984, without the
weekly religious services. The inclusion of some business discussions in the weekly meeting was not sufficient to free the weekly
meeting of its inherently religious nature. The Ninth Circuit
defined the heart of the employee's Title VII protections: "Protecting an employee's right to be free from forced observance of
the religion of his employer is at the heart of the Title VII's
prohibition against religious discrimination."3 7
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concomitantly recognized the
owners' admittedly subordinated free exercise rights, and narrowed the scope of the lower court's injunction. The district court
improperly enjoined all mandatory religious services at the

34.

Id. at 613.

35.
36.

Id. at 619.
Id. at 615.

37.

Id. at 620-21.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995

13

132

Montana
Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 5
MONTANA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

employer's Arizona facility. This was unduly broad, and unnecessarily trammelled the owners' free exercise rights. Rather, only
those employees who objected to attending the religious services
and asked to be excused from physically attending would be
protected. Otherwise, the mandatory nature of the services alone
was not a sufficient basis upon which to support the original
injunction. This careful judicial tailoring of the respective
parties' interests may hold the key to satisfactory judicial construction of any future EEOC proposed guidelines.
II. THE PROPOSED RELIGIOUS HARASSMENT GUIDELINES OF THE
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

One can best acquire the flavor of the controversy surrounding the EEOC proposed guidelines by surveying the June 9, 1994
testimony before Congress by proponents and critics of the proposed guidelines. Although even the proponents conceded the
guidelines' potential problems with unconstitutional vagueness,
probable conflict with RFRA and the First Amendment right of
free exercise of religion, the practical bases that warrant further
careful consideration of the guidelines, such as those augured in
the Townley decision, will continue to occur.
A. SupportingArguments
Marc Stem, of the American Jewish Congress, argued that
religious harassment, no less than racial or sexual harassment,
could result in the denial of equal opportunity.38 He maintained
that the religious harassment guidelines should be retained
because religious harassment is still a "real problem." According
to EEOC statistics, over 500 religious harassment complaints are
filed annually-a fifth of all religious discrimination complaints
brought before the EEOC. Stern equated any removal of religious harassment from the EEOC guidelines as tantamount to
sending the message that religious harassment was not taken
seriously or was not illegal. He did, however, recognize that the
EEOC must further clarify the proposed guidelines. Stern
analogized religious harassment to sexual harassment; likewise,
to be unlawful, religious harassment must be sufficiently severe

38. Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S.B. 578 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Marc D. Stern on behalf of the American Jewish Congress).
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or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment or
to create an abusive working environment. He concluded that
proselytizing is not religious harassment, and provided several
general principles that the EEOC could adopt:
- employees may not be compelled to participate in religious
or anti-religious activities;
- employers, supervisors, and employees may engage in passive religious speech, display posters, slogans, or wear religious
medals, buttons, or jewelry;
- in assessing whether a hostile work environment exists,
the fact-finder must remember that religious speech is a very
important value in society;
- where an employee is approached about a religious theme
by an employer, supervisor, or another employee, and then asks
that the discussion stop, that employee's request should ordinarily be honored;
- persistent repeated efforts to proselytize could constitute
harassment; and
- employers are required to reasonably accommodate employee requests seeking insulation from even passive religious
speech.
This may be the salient weakness in the EEOC guidelines: if
an employee asks to have a religious symbol removed from the
personal work area, the employee must be accommodated. This
would indicate to employers that the only safe way to avoid controversy and allegations of religious harassment is to maintain a
religion-free workplace. One employee may display religious
symbols, but another may ask that they be removed. One employee cites free exercise rights, while the other employee alleges
a hostile work environment. The proposed guidelines favor the
latter in each instance.
Elizabeth M. Thornton, acting counsel of the EEOC, testified
that the conception that the proposed guidelines were designed
to suppress religious expression was simply wrong. 9 Instead,
she maintained that the guidelines were designed to explain and
interpret existing law, rather than to create new causes of action. The EEOC proposed guidelines were the work of Joy
Cherian, and were designed to address all types of prohibited ha-

39. Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S.B. 578 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (June 9, 1994) (Testimony of Elizabeth M. Thornton

on behalf of the EEOC).
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rassment. The EEOC, in drafting the proposed guidelines, carefully considered decades of judicial and commission precedent.
Drafters recognize workplace harassment offends Title VII's
broad principle of workplace equality. Thornton also acknowledged that the EEOC needed to clarify further the proposed
guidelines, to comply with RFRA.
Douglas Gallegos, executive director of the EEOC, testified
that the guidelines provide that conduct towards an employee
constitutes unlawful harassment only when it is unwelcome and
when it severely or pervasively denigrates or shows hostility on
the basis of religion. 40 His testimony was directly analogous to
the long-established and Supreme Court-endorsed EEOC guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace.4 '
B. CriticalArguments
One of the strongest critics of the EEOC proposed guidelines
was Representative Howard P. McKeon. In his testimony before
Congress, he said that the guidelines were "irresponsible", redefined harassment beyond the standards set forth by the Supreme
Court, and could result in the infringement of religious liberty.42
He particularly took aim at the EEOC's expansion of employer
liability to an employee's friends, family, and associates, which
in his estimation, would necessitate a "religion-free" workplace.
McKeon said the EEOC's "lumping" of religious harassment with
sexual harassment was "irresponsible and unnecessary, as if the
two were equally offensive."'
Louis P. Sheldon, Chairman of the Traditional Values Coalition, testified that the proposed guidelines were too broad and
rested on subjective factors, and that constitutionally protected
religious expression could easily be punished as harassment."

40. Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S.B. 578 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Douglas Gallegos on
behalf of the EEOC).
41. The EEOC guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment in employment as an
unlawful form of sex discrimination, promulgated in 1980, have twice been sustained
by the unanimous Supreme Court. Harris v. Forklift Systems, 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993);
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
42. Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S.B. 578 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Howard P. McKeon on
behalf of the 25th District of California).
43. Id.
44. Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S.B. 578 Before the
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He also expressed concern equating religious harassment with
harassment based on race, national origin, or sex. He warned
that the guidelines, which specify that an employer has an affirmative duty to maintain a working environment free of harassment, would compel an employer to ban all religious activity and
religious expression.
Robert S. Peck, legislative counsel of the American Civil
Liberties Union, warned that the proposed guidelines failed to
reflect sufficient sensitivity to constitutional problems created by
attempts to regulate expression, and could unlawfully inhibit
protected First Amendment free expression.45 However, he lauded the efforts of the EEOC and urged the EEOC not to drop
religion from the guidelines but, rather, to rewrite the guidelines. He urged the EEOC to incorporate its own "Fact Sheet"
into the guidelines, because it better defined the EEOC's goal: a
reasonable person standard of what was abusive or hostile; an
isolated instance would not be an offense; recognizing the difference between passive religious speech, and that which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.
He also called on the EEOC to provide further examples of what
would constitute harassment. He disagreed with Representative
McKeon's opinion that religion ought to be dropped from the
guidelines entirely, saying that deletion serves no useful purpose
and will be harmful to those who need the protection of the law.
Professor Douglas Laycock of the University of Texas School
of Law testified that the guidelines would violate the First
Amendment and RFRA because of vagueness and not being sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy RFRA. 4 He used as an example of the imprecision of the guidelines the atheist who feels
that religious symbolism or speech is inherently abusive and
hostile; the atheist probably feels all religious icons make the
workplace hostile.
Laycock suggested that quid pro quo religious harassment

Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Louis P. Sheldon on
behalf of the Traditional Values Coalition).
45.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S.B. 578 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Seas. (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Robert S. Peck on

behalf of the ACLU).
46.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S.B. 578 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Professor Douglas

Laycock).
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could be prohibited, as well as religious epithets, slurs, and negative stereotypes. Persistent proselytizing, after repeated requests
not to do so, could be harassment. However, affirmative expressions of one's own religious beliefs, or lack thereof, would not be
harassment. Neither would religious or political propositions,
since this would be constitutionally protected free speech. Instead of the current plethora of the guideline terms, such as
"intimidating," "denigrates," and "aversion," he urged the EEOC
to retain only "hostile" and "abusive" as terms describing unlawful harassment.
Professor Laycock offered several hypothetical examples
across a spectrum to elucidate revised guidelines that he could
support:
- An employee tells another during a coffee break that he
believes Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation and that non
believers are destined for eternal damnation. This would not be a
violation, because it is a zealous statement of one's belief and not
a personalized or disparaging attack on another employee or
religion.
- A Muslim employee distributes tracts to co-workers which
communicate that there is no God but Allah, and that Mohammed is his prophet. Likewise, this would not be a violation.
- A Jewish employee wears a yarmulke, hangs a Star of
David on his office wall, and put a mezuzah on his office door.
This would not be a violation, because wearing or displaying
religious symbols does not disparage other employees or religious
groups.
- An atheist employer, with strong pro-choice views, keeps a
sign on her desk saying, "Keep your rosaries off my ovaries," and
circulates a fund-raising letter from a non-profit organization
referring to "right-wing Christian bigots." This would not be a
violation, although it is a closer case than the previous examples.
While it may be read as an epithet, the slogan is meant to be
colorful and memorable.47
- An employee whistles "Onward Christian Soldiers" and
other hymns regularly, and refers to herself as a "prayer warrior." This is not a violation, because it does not disparage anyone or any religion.
47.
Only a few days before Professor Laycock offered this hypothetical example
in his June, 1994 testimony before the Senate, a federal district court ruled that,
under Title VII, an employer was not required to accommodate an office employee

wearing a graphic anti-abortion button. Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 860 F.
Supp. 665 (D. Neb. 1994).
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- A Jewish supervisor suggests that a subordinate, who has
revealed that he is experiencing a marital crisis, would benefit
from a marriage counseling service run by the Jewish
supervisor's synagogue. This is not a violation, because an invitation or suggestion that one participate in a religious event is not
harassment.
- An employer leads a daily Bible study at lunch hour, which
most of the employees voluntarily attend. Some attendees have
informed non-attendees that the group has prayed for them. This
is not a violation, because it does not disparage those who did
not attend.
- A Hindu employer often invites employees to temple ceremonies and religious festivals. The employees consistently decline the invitations, but never express offense. This is not a
violation, because the employees never indicated that the invitations were unwelcome.
- A nonreligious supervisor often uses expressions "Jesus
Christ" and "God damn" when angry or frustrated, often in the
presence of Christian employees, who have asked him to stop on
the grounds that such cursing violates the Third Commandment.
While this is not a violation of the proposed guidelines, Professor
Laycock indicated that he would have no objection if this were
regarded as a borderline case.
- A supervisor and employee frequently direct religious slurs
and taunts at another employee. This would clearly constitute
religious harassment.
Michael Whitehead, general counsel for the Southern Baptist Convention Christian Life Commission, testified that religious harassment should not be included in the "one-size-fits-all"
guidelines.' He maintained that religion ought to be deleted
from the proposed guidelines, citing many obvious differences
between religious and sexual harassment; only free exercise of
religion is expressly protected by the First Amendment. He also
criticized the guidelines as overly broad, especially the current
absence of the requirement of unwelcomeness. The overall effect,
he predicts, would be an unconstitutional chilling effect on free
religious expression in the workplace and would create religionfree workplaces.

48. Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S.B. 578 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (June 9, 1994) (testimony of Michael K, Whitehead,
J.D., on behalf of the Southern Baptist Convention).
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No prominent cases dealing with labor or employment issues
directly involving RFRA have yet been reported. All of the major
critics of the EEOC proposed guidelines, however, voiced fears
that the guidelines would have the effect of suppressing religion
in the workplace in violation of both RFRA and the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.49
Additionally, the proposed reasonable person test of the
guidelines was criticized. Unlike sexual harassment cases with
the standard of a reasonable woman, in the proposed religious
harassment cases, the employer has no real knowledge of the
appropriate legal standard by which to measure speech and conduct. Instead, the reasonable person would be gauged from the
perspective of the reasonable victim, according to the guidelines.
The critics generally focused on the fact that the guidelines
fail to distinguish between religious expression, slurs, derogatory
comments, and hostile work environment. The guidelines also
violate RFRA because they are not the least restrictive means of
promoting free expression. °
III. DISCUSSION
Sexual harassment is egregious, outrageous, and unlawful
on its face. While First Amendment freedom of expression, association, speech, and press may be implicated in some instances of
possible sexual harassment, sexual harassment itself enjoys no
constitutional protection. However, free exercise of religion, expressly protected by the First Amendment, is perhaps the most
fundamental human freedom. Unlawful sexual harassment and
constitutionally protected free exercise of religion are worlds
apart. But worlds can collide. In some instances, unlawful religious harassment can be the perniciously transmogrified consequence of uncompromising and intolerant religious practices.
Does pernicious religious harassment continue to afflict the
secular workplace? Most definitely. On August 3, 1994, for example, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in Finnemore v. Bangor
Hydro-Electric Co.,5 found that a fundamentalist Christian employee may have been a victim of unlawful religious harassment
in the workplace, in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act.
49.
50.
46 (C.D.
right to

See, e.g., supra notes 42-48.
See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1440Cal. June 9, 1994) (upholding fire department employee's First Amendment
read soft-core pornography in the workplace, despite sexual harassment law

prohibition of such unwelcome depictions of women within the magazines).
51.

645 A.2d 15 (Me. 1994).
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Co-workers routinely made sexually explicit comments regarding
one another's spouses. When the Christian employee complained
to co-workers that he found their comments offensive to his religious beliefs, they then viciously made his wife the subject of
their sexually denigrating remarks. The Maine court found that
one element of a religious harassment claim under the state law
was that the precipitating comments must be of a "religious
nature," and that a test for determining whether a comment is of
such a nature is whether it was made because of the individual's
religious beliefs or would not otherwise have occurred but for the
individual's religion. Because these are questions of fact, the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court reversed the lower court's summary judgment for the employer and remanded the case for
trial.52

When Title VII was enacted, the primary emphasis of the
statute was to protect more fully and adequately the religious
practices of those discrete and insular minorities not fully able to
otherwise assert their religious rights in majoritarian environments. 53 The contemporary situation in employment contexts

can often be markedly different. It may not always be the subordinate employee as religious practitioner who must be protected
from antireligious secular employers.' Rather, in a fashion that
the drafters of Title VII never anticipated, it may be the atheist,
agnostic, non-aligned, or otherwise-aligned subordinate employee

who asserts the protections of Title VII. This is one, but only
one, important new dimension of the complex contemporary

52. Id. at 17. For other cases regarding religious harassment in the secular
workplace, see, for example, Smallzman v. Sea Breeze, 60 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1031
(BNA) (D. Md. 1993) (holding a Jewish employee who endured anti-Semitic harassment stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Turner v. Barr,
806 F.Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1992) (enjoining religious slurs by employees, contrary to
employee's religious beliefs); Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va.
1984) (holding a Jewish employee subjected to religious slurs and demeaning criticism in front of other workers was able to proceed with claim of unlawful religious
harassment). See also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1804 (1992) (discussing cases regarding religious harassment
in the secular workplace).
53. See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
54. Until Smith, the Supreme Court had been at least nominally solicitous of
protecting the free exercise right of the religious minority practitioner in secular
employment. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)
(holding Florida's denial of unemployment compensation to Sabbatarian who refused
to work on her sabbath violated her free exercise right). But see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479
U.S. 60 (1987) (holding Title VII reasonable accommodation duty of employer towards
religious employee's practices is no more than de minimis).
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debate.
Five years ago, before Smith and certainly before any EEOC
proposed guidelines, I anticipated situations where religious
activities in the workplace could potentially be analogized to
unlawful sexual harassment. My preliminary concerns then are
even more apt now. As I said in 1990 in my article in the Notre

Dame Journalof Law, Ethics & Public Policy:
The initial request or suggestion or invitation extended by
senior management to subordinate employees to attend, for example, a prayer meeting or a prayer breakfast, or the opening
of a business meeting with a prayer, will more likely be unexpected or surprising rather than inherently unwelcome or repugnant. Employees may feel nonplussed, embarrassed, curious, or uncomfortable, but it is not likely that most employees
would find the first overture to pray inherently reprehensible.
This is not to say that, as in tort law, the first bite is free and
that there can never be any harm caused by asking.5 Religion
rarely leaves one completely unaffected. While adult employees
are not as susceptible to institutional prayer as the public
school children in Engle v. Vitale", the initial exposure to
prayer may quickly transmogrify into an unwelcome, unpleasant experience for the subordinate employee.
But neither is this to equate prayer with, for example,
sexual harassment. Prayer is inherently affirming. Sexual harassment has nothing whatever affirming about it, and is inherently repulsive. For committed atheists, prayer is a silly
waste of time. Of course, for the atheist or for the employee
identified with another religion, coerced, involuntary submission to prayer certainly could quickly become fully as unwelcome as sexual harassment. Coerced prayer potentially can be
religious harassment (to say nothing of how the prayer itself is
also debased). The core test to determine whether unlawful
employee sexual harassment has occurred is whether the overture is unwelcome.57 Objectively, sexual harassment is egregiously, tortiously offensive by its very essence; prayer is not.
But if the prayer environment becomes coerced and involun-

55. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1055 (1936).
56. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see also Wallace, Gov. of Ala. v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) (holding Alabama moment of silence statute, which expressly encouraged silent
prayer, violated Establishment Clause).
57. Meritor v. Savings Bank, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The correct inquiry is
whether [the victim] by her conduct indicated that the sexual advances were unwelcome"). See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Sex
Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. 1504.11 (1986).
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tary, it potentially can become as offensive and as repugnant as
unlawful sexual harassment.5

The American Bar Association advertises a member's prayer
group session at its annual meeting. Members of the United
States Congress hold prayer meetings. Why cannot private employees do the same? RFRA would seem to protect their rights;
the EEOC proposed guidelines would seem to abolish them. But
religious harassment is not really about prayer; it is about repeated, unwelcome conduct.
The United States has historically been a religious nation.
People have struggled for millennia over how to live a holy life in
the secular city. 9 The Constitution expressly protects the free
exercise of religion as one of our most important rights.
It is unlikely that any government agency can perfectly
calibrate the ideal balance to maximize the most fundamental
religious values while protecting others' potentially contradictory
rights. But it is not a perfect world that lawyers are obliged to
work within.' Therefore, the EEOC proposed guidelines, if responsibly revised, will merit future careful consideration. Prayer
is perhaps the best good faith example of the well-intentioned
person engaged in religious belief manifestation in the secular
workplace, especially if the prayer occurs in a silent, or largely
quiet and low key, fashion. But prayer with a more proselytizing,
evangelical dimension can become quickly problematic, vis-a-vis
other workers.
But let's face it. Religious harassment usually will be about
overt conduct, and not about prayer in the least intrusive and
quiet environments that the prior discussion generally has posited. Neither is sexual harassment usually about good faith, nonintrusive conversation; sexual harassment usually has a much
more direct, confrontational overt action component to it.
Prohibiting religious harassment in the workplace would not
force religious employees to artificially trifurcate their personal
and professional and internal prayer lives, just as sexual harassment prohibition does not force one to deny their sexuality. Rather, prohibition of religious harassment and of sexual harassment
should properly be about protecting the other person from the
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manifestly unwelcome and egregious conduct-intensive intrusion
into, and disregard or disrespect for, the autonomy of the other
person.
After many months of laborious work a decade and a half
ago, the EEOC produced responsible and generally carefully
calibrated guidelines to define broadly, and to prohibit effectively, unlawful sexual harassment in the workplace. The EEOC
guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment were not uniformly
well received by the federal courts. For much of the prior decade
of the seventies, the lower federal courts were split over whether
sexual harassment was a form of unlawful discrimination prohibited by the Title VII sex discrimination provision or, although
reprehensible as a social and moral matter, not effectively
sanctionable by Title VII. Fortunately, by 1986, the EEOC guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment came before the United
States Supreme Court and, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing
for a unanimous Court in his first term as the Chief Justice, the
EEOC guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment in the
workplace were sustained as having the full force of Title VII
61
law.

Sexual harassment cannot be fully eradicated by legal sanction alone, but there is no doubt that federal civil rights law in
the workplace has provided one powerful instrument with which
to at least begin to address, and to remedy, this pathological
social dysfunction. Likewise, the law alone will not put an end to
religious harassment in the workplace. However, carefully recalibrated future EEOC guidelines designed to prohibit unlawful
religious harassment in the secular workplace, while respecting
RFRA and appreciating the legitimate distinctions between free
exercise of religion expressly protected by the First Amendment
and sexual activity without such a powerful express constitutional grounding, can likewise begin to make the secular workplace a
more civil and perhaps an even more decent place.
IV. CONCLUSION

Unlike most of the authors in this symposium, I am not
persuaded as to whether RFRA is unconstitutional. I am profoundly opposed to the pernicious Smith decision, and I hope
that the Court will one day expressly repudiate it.
If RFRA is constitutional, the religious rights of the conven-
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tional religious majorities may be most protected in the secular
workplace; I doubt seriously whether the religious minorities not
within the mainstream and socially orthodox religions will most
effectively or most frequently assert RFRA protections. My practical concern is that those most in need of RFRA, the adherents
of the socially peripheral, marginalized, and disfavored religions
and sects, will be ground under in the secular workplace by their
majoritarian religious co-workers; mainstream Christians will far
outnumber the minority sect adherents in most secular
workplaces.
The subordination of RFRA rights of the religious minorities
to the religious majorities would be an ironic twist to RFRA.
While this is a very real concern, I doubt that, on balance, the
nation would be better off without RFRA. We, as a nation, would
certainly be better off without the Smith decision. But, as a very
practical matter, unless and until the Supreme Court is internally persuaded to reverse Smith, RFRA is a very important tool to
situate and to protect religious freedoms. In the best of all
worlds, there would be no need for RFRA, and the free exercise
rights of all would fully flower, without the need of express constitutional declarations, and Smith decisions would be inconceivable. But, alas, this is not yet a perfect world, and RFRAs are
necessary and practical legislative instruments designed to partially ameliorate the pernicious consequences of the Smith decision.
If RFRA is ultimately sustained by the Court, rejuvenated
future EEOC guidelines, carefully recalibrated to respect RFRA
and the First Amendment, could probably pass muster. If RFRA
is struck down, future EEOC guidelines prohibiting unlawful
religious harassment in the secular workplace can more readily
be effectuated as a more immediate matter. However, the unconstitutionality of RFRA should not be cause for rejoicing within
the EEOC or among any persons favoring the promulgation of
the guidelines to prohibit religious harassment in the secular
workplace. For, properly and fully understood, RFRA is not a bar
or even an impediment to the EEOC guidelines; it is not even a
hurdle. Rather, RFRA is a nobly-intended legislative construct,
necessitated by the Smith decision, under which the administrative agency's guidelines should be carefully recalibrated and
eventually effectuated.
For the moment, the EEOC proposed guidelines initiative
has been legislatively suspended. But, in time, the EEOC initiaPublished by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995
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tive should be carefully reinvigorated, thoughtfully tailored and
effectively implemented.
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